Everything about Battle Of Cape Esperance totally explained
|combatant2=
|commander1=
Robert L. Ghormley,
Norman Scott
|commander2=
Gunichi Mikawa,
Aritomo Gotō,
Takatsugu Jojima
|strength1=4
cruisers,
5
destroyers
|strength2=3 cruisers,
8 destroyers,
2
seaplane tenders
|casualties1=1 destroyer sunk,
1 cruiser,
1 destroyer heavily damaged,
163 killed
| casualties2=1 cruiser,
3 destroyers sunk,
1 cruiser heavily damaged,
341–454 killed,
111 captured
|}}
The
Battle of Cape Esperance, also known as the
Second Battle of Savo Island and, in Japanese sources, as the, took place October 11 – 12, 1942, and was a
naval battle of the
Pacific campaign of
World War II between the
Imperial Japanese Navy and
United States Navy. The battle was the third of five major naval engagements during the
Guadalcanal campaign and took place at the entrance to the
strait between
Savo Island and
Guadalcanal in the
Solomon Islands.
On the night of
October 11, Japanese naval forces in the Solomon Islands area, under the command of
Gunichi Mikawa, sent a major supply and reinforcement convoy to their forces on Guadalcanal. The convoy consisted of two
seaplane tenders and six
destroyers and was commanded by
Rear Admiral Takatsugu Jojima. At the same time but in a separate operation, three heavy
cruisers and two destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral
Aritomo Gotō were to
bombard the
Allied airfield on Guadalcanal (called
Henderson Field by the Allies) with the object of destroying Allied aircraft and the airfield's facilities.
Shortly before midnight on
October 11, a U.S force of four cruisers and five destroyers, under the command of Rear Admiral
Norman Scott, intercepted Gotō's force as it approached Savo Island near Guadalcanal. Taking the Japanese by surprise, Scott's warships sank one of Gotō's cruisers and one of his destroyers, heavily damaged another cruiser, mortally wounded Gotō, and forced the rest of Gotō's warships to abandon the bombardment mission and retreat. During the exchange of gunfire, one of Scott's destroyers was sunk and one cruiser and another destroyer were heavily damaged. In the meantime, the Japanese supply convoy successfully completed unloading at Guadalcanal and began its return journey without being discovered by Scott's force. Later on the morning of
October 12, four Japanese destroyers from the supply convoy turned-back to assist Gotō's retreating, damaged warships. Air attacks by U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field sank two of these destroyers later that day.
Despite Scott's victory in the action, the battle had little immediate, strategic implications. Just two nights later two Japanese
battleships bombarded and almost destroyed Henderson Field, and more Japanese reinforcements were successfully delivered to the island.
Background
On
August 7,
1942 Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal,
Tulagi, and
Florida Islands in the
Solomon Islands. The objective was to deny the islands to the Japanese as
bases for threatening the
supply routes between the U.S. and
Australia, and secure starting points for a
campaign to isolate the major Japanese base at
Rabaul while also supporting the Allied
New Guinea campaign. The
Guadalcanal campaign would last six months.
Taking the Japanese by surprise, by nightfall on
August 8, the Allied forces, mainly consisting of United States
Marines, had
secured Tulagi and nearby small islands, as well as an airfield (later completed and named
Henderson Field by the Allies) under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. Allied aircraft operating out of Henderson became known as the "
Cactus Air Force" (CAF) after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal
In response, the Japanese
Imperial General Headquarters assigned the
Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army, a
corps-sized formation headquartered at Rabaul under Lieutenant-General
Harukichi Hyakutake, with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces. Beginning
August 19,
1942, various units of the 17th Army began to arrive on Guadalcanal with the goal of driving Allied forces from the island.
Because of the threat by CAF aircraft based at Henderson Field, the Japanese were unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver their troops and supplies to the island, and warships were used, instead. These, mainly light
cruisers or
destroyers, were usually able to make the round trip down "
The Slot" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to CAF air attack. Delivering troops in this manner, however, prevented most of the heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being delivered with them. In addition, they expended destroyers IJN desperately needed for
commerce defense. These high speed runs occurred throughout the campaign and were later called the "
Tokyo Express" by the Allies and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese.
The Japanese controlled the seas around the Solomon Islands during the nighttime. However, any Japanese ship remaining within range of the aircraft at Henderson Field during the daylight hours (about
200 miles (322 km)) was in great danger from damaging air attack. This situation existed for several months during the campaign.
The first attempt by the Japanese Army to recapture Henderson Field was on
August 21,
1942, in the
Battle of the Tenaru, and the next, the
Battle of Edson's Ridge, lasting
September 12 through
September 14, both ended in Japanese defeats.
After Edson's Ridge, the Japanese set their next major attempt to recapture Henderson Field for
October 20 and moved most of the 2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions, totalling 17,500 troops, from the
Dutch East Indies to Rabaul in preparation for delivering them to Guadalcanal. Between
September 14 and
October 9, numerous Tokyo Express runs delivered troops from the Japanese 2nd Infantry Division as well as General Hyakutake to Guadalcanal. In addition to cruisers and destroyers, some of these runs included the Japanese
seaplane tender Nisshin to deliver heavy equipment to the island including vehicles and heavy artillery other warships couldn't carry because of space limitations. The Japanese Navy promised to support the Army's planned offensive by delivering the necessary troops, equipment, and supplies to the island, and by stepping up air attacks on Henderson Field and sending warships to bombard the airfield.
In the meantime,
Major General Millard F. Harmon, commander of
United States Army forces in the South Pacific, convinced
Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, overall commander of Allied forces in the
South Pacific, Marines on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next expected Japanese offensive. Thus, on
October 8, the 2,837 men of the
164th Infantry Regiment from the U.S. Army's
Americal Division boarded ships at
New Caledonia for the trip to Guadalcanal with a projected arrival date of
October 13.
To protect the transports carrying the 164th to Guadalcanal, Ghormley ordered Task Force 64, consisting of four cruisers,
USS San Francisco,
USS Boise,
USS Salt Lake City, and
USS Helena, and five destroyers,
USS Farenholt,
USS Duncan,
USS Buchanan,
USS McCalla, and
USS Laffey, under U.S. Rear Admiral
Norman Scott, to intercept and combat any Japanese ships approaching Guadalcanal and threatening the convoy. Scott conducted one night battle practice with his ships on
October 8, then took station south of Guadalcanal near
Rennell Island on
October 9, to await word of any Japanese naval movement towards the southern Solomons.
Continuing with preparations for the October offensive, Japanese Vice Admiral
Gunichi Mikawa's Eighth Fleet staff, headquartered at Rabaul, scheduled a large and "singularly important" Tokyo Express supply run for the night of
October 11.
Nisshin would be joined by seaplane tender
Chitose to deliver 728 soldiers, four large
howitzers, two
field guns, one antiaircraft gun, and a large assortment of ammunition and other equipment from the Japanese naval bases in the
Shortland Islands and at Buin,
Bougainville, to Guadalcanal. Six destroyers, five of them carrying troops, would accompany
Nisshin and
Chitose. The supply convoy, called the
Reinforcement Group by the Japanese, was under the command of Rear Admiral
Takatsugu Jojima. At the same time but in a separate operation the three heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 6 (CruDiv6),
Aoba,
Kinugasa, and
Furutaka, under the command of
Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō, were to bombard Henderson Field with special explosive shells with the object of destroying the CAF and the airfield's facilities. Two screening destroyers,
Fubuki and
Hatsuyuki, accompanied CruDiv6. Since U.S. Navy warships had yet to attempt to interdict any Tokyo Express missions to Guadalcanal, the Japanese were not expecting any opposition from U.S. naval surface forces that night.
Battle
Prelude
At 08:00 on Sunday,
October 11, Jojima's reinforcement group departed the
Shortland Islands anchorage to begin their
250 miles (402 km) run down the Slot to Guadalcanal. The six destroyers that accompanied
Nisshin and
Chitose included
Asagumo,
Natsugumo,
Yamagumo,
Shirayuki,
Murakumo, and
Akizuki. Gotō departed the Shortland Islands for Guadalcanal at 14:00 the same day.
To protect the reinforcement group's approach to Guadalcanal from the CAF, the Japanese 11th Air Fleet, based at Rabaul,
Kavieng, and Buin, planned two air strikes on Henderson Field for
October 11. A "fighter sweep" of 17
A6M Zeros swept over Henderson Field just after mid-day but failed to engage any U.S. aircraft. Forty-five minutes later the second wave, 45
"Betty" bombers and 30 Zeros, arrived over Henderson Field. In an ensuing air battle with the CAF, one Betty and two U.S. fighters were downed. Although the Japanese attacks failed to inflict significant damage, they did prevent CAF bombers from finding and attacking the reinforcement group. As the reinforcement group transited the Slot, relays of 11th Air Fleet Zeros from Buin provided escort. Emphasizing the importance of this convoy for Japanese plans, the last flight of the day was ordered to remain on station over the convoy until darkness, then
ditch their aircraft and await pickup by the reinforcement group's destroyers. All six Zeros ditched; only one pilot was recovered.
Allied
reconnaissance aircraft sighted Jojima's supply convoy
210 miles (338 km) from Guadalcanal between
Kolombangara and
Choiseul in the Slot at 14:45 on the same day and reported it as two "cruisers" and six destroyers. Gotō's force, following the convoy, wasn't sighted. In response to the sighting of Jojima's force, at 16:07 Scott turned toward Guadalcanal for an interception.
Up to this point, the Allies had lost every surface night battle with the Japanese navy, losing eight cruisers and three destroyers without sinking a single Japanese warship. Aware of the Japanese advantage in night fighting, Scott crafted a simple battle plan for the expected engagement. His ships would steam in column with his destroyers at the front and rear of his cruiser column. The destroyers were to illuminate any targets with searchlights and discharge torpedoes while the cruisers were to open fire at any available targets without awaiting orders. The cruiser's float aircraft, launched in advance, were to find and illuminate the Japanese warships with flares. Although
Helena and
Boise carried the new, greatly improved SG
radar, Scott chose
San Francisco as his
flagship.
At 22:00, as Scott's ships neared
Cape Hunter at the northwest end of Guadalcanal, three of Scott's cruisers launched floatplanes. One crashed on takeoff, but the other two patrolled over Savo Island, Guadalcanal, and
Ironbottom Sound. As the floatplanes were launched, Jojima's force was just passing around the mountainous northwestern shoulder of Guadalcanal, and neither force sighted each other. At 22:20, Jojima radioed Gotō and told him that no U.S. ships were in the vicinity. Although Jojima's force later heard Scott's floatplanes overhead while unloading along the north shore of Guadalcanal, they failed to report this to Gotō.
At 22:33, just after passing Cape Esperance, Scott's ships assumed battle formation. The column was led by
Farenholt,
Duncan, and
Laffey, and followed by
San Francisco,
Boise,
Salt Lake City, and
Helena.
Buchanan and
McCalla brought up the rear. The distance between each ship ranged from
500 yards (457 m) to
700 yards (640 m). Visibility was poor because the moon had already set, leaving no
ambient light and no visible sea
horizon.
Gotō's force passed through several rain
squalls as they approached Guadalcanal at
30 knots (56 km/h). Gotō's flagship
Aoba led the Japanese cruisers in column, followed by
Furutaka and
Kinugasa.
Fubuki was
starboard of
Aoba and
Hatsuyuki to
port. At 23:30, Gotō's ships emerged from the last rain squall and began appearing on the radar scopes of
Helena and
Salt Lake City. The Japanese, however, remained unaware of Scott's presence.
Action
At 23:00, the
San Francisco aircraft spotted Jojima's force off Guadalcanal and reported it to Scott. Scott, believing that more Japanese ships were likely still on the way, continued his course towards the west side of Savo Island. At 23:33, Scott ordered his column to turn towards the southwest to a heading of 230 degrees. All of Scott's ships understood the order as a column movement except Scott's own ship,
San Francisco. As the three lead U.S. destroyers executed the column movement,
San Francisco turned simultaneously.
Boise, following immediately behind, followed
San Francisco, thereby throwing the three van destroyers out of formation.
At 23:32
Helena's radar showed the Japanese warships to be about
27,700 yards (25,329 m) away. At 23:35,
Boise's and
Duncan's radars also detected Gotō's ships. Between 23:42 and 23:44,
Helena and
Boise reported their contacts to Scott on
San Francisco who mistakenly believed that the two cruisers were actually tracking the three U.S. destroyers that were thrown out of formation during the column turn. Scott radioed
Farenholt to ask if the destroyer was attempting to resume its station at the front of the column.
Farenholt replied, "Affirmative, coming up on your starboard side," further confirming Scott's belief that the radar contacts were his own destroyers.
At 23:45
Farenholt and
Laffey, still unaware of Gotō's approaching warships, increased speed to resume their stations at the front of the U.S. column.
Duncan's crew, however, thinking that
Farenholt and
Laffey were commencing an attack on the Japanese warships, increased speed to launch a solitary torpedo attack on Gotō's force without telling Scott what they were doing.
San Francisco's radar registered the Japanese ships, but Scott wasn't informed of the sighting. By 23:45, Gotō's ships were only
5,000 yards (4,572 m) away from Scott's formation and visible to
Helena's and
Salt Lake City's lookouts. The U.S. formation at this point was in position to
cross the T of the Japanese formation, giving Scott's ships a significant tactical advantage. At 23:46, still assuming that Scott was aware of the rapidly approaching Japanese warships,
Helena radioed for permission to open fire, using the general procedure request, "Interrogatory Roger" (meaning, basically, "Are we clear to act?"). Scott answered with, "Roger," only meaning that the message was received, not that he was confirming the request to act. Upon receipt of Scott's "Roger,"
Helena, thinking they now had permission, opened fire, quickly followed by
Boise,
Salt Lake City, and to Scott's surprise,
San Francisco.
Gotō's force was taken almost completely by surprise. At 23:43
Aoba's lookouts sighted Scott's force, but Gotō assumed that they were Jojima's ships. Two minutes later,
Aoba's lookouts identified the ships as American, but Gotō remained skeptical and directed his ships to flash indentification signals. As
Aoba's crew executed Gotō's order, the first American salvo smashed into
Aoba's superstructure.
Aoba was quickly hit by up to 40 shells from
Helena,
Salt Lake City,
San Francisco,
Farenholt, and
Laffey. The shell hits heavily damaged
Aoba's communications systems and demolished two of her main gun turrets as well as her main gun director. Several large-caliber projectiles passed through
Aoba's flag bridge without exploding, but the force of their passage killed many men and mortally wounded Gotō.
Scott, still unsure who his ships were firing at, and afraid that they might be firing on his own destroyers, ordered a ceasefire at 23:47, although not every ship complied. Scott ordered
Farenholt to flash her recognition signals and upon observing that
Farenholt was close to his formation, he ordered the fire resumed at 23:51.
Aoba, continuing to receive damaging hits, turned to starboard to head away from Scott's formation and began making a smoke screen which led most of the Scott's ships to believe that she was sinking. Scott's ships shifted their fire to
Furutaka, which was following behind
Aoba. At 21:49
Furutaka was hit in her
torpedo tubes, igniting a large fire that attracted even more shellfire from Scott's ships. At 23:58, a torpedo from
Buchanan hit
Furutaka in her forward engine room, causing severe damage. During this time,
San Francisco and
Boise sighted
Fubuki about
1,400 yards (1,280 m) away and raked her with shellfire, joined soon by most of the rest of Scott's ships. Heavily damaged,
Fubuki began to sink.
Kinugasa and
Hatsuyuki turned to port instead of to starboard and escaped the immediate attention of Scott's ships.
During the exchange of gunfire,
Farenholt received several damaging hits from both the Japanese and American ships, killing several men. She escaped from the crossfire by crossing ahead of San Francisco' and passing to the disengaged side of Scott's column.
Duncan, still engaged in her solitary torpedo attack on the Japanese formation, was also hit by gunfire from both sides, set afire, and looped away in her own effort to escape the crossfire.
As Gotō's ships endeavored to escape, Scott's ships tightened their formation and then turned to pursue the retreating Japanese warships. At 00:06, two torpedoes from
Kinugasa barely missed
Boise.
Boise and
Salt Lake City turned on their searchlights to help target the Japanese ships, giving
Kinugasa's gunners clear targets. At 00:10, two shells from
Kinugasa exploded in
Boise's main ammunition magazine between turrets one and two. The resulting explosion killed almost 100 men and threatened to blow the ship apart. Seawater rushed in through rents in her hull opened by the explosion and helped quench the fire before it could explode the ship's powder magazines.
Boise immediately sheered out of the column and retreated from the action.
Kinugasa and
Salt Lake City exchanged fire with each other, each hitting the other several times, causing minor damage to
Kinugasa and damaging one of
Salt Lake City's boilers, reducing her speed.
At 00:16 Scott ordered his ships to turn to a heading of 330 degrees in an attempt to pursue the fleeing Japanese ships. Scott's ships, however, quickly lost sight of Gotō's ships, and all firing ceased by 00:20. The American formation was beginning to scatter, so Scott ordered a turn to 205 degrees to disengage.
Retreat
During the battle between Scott's and Gotō's ships, Jojima's reinforcement group completed unloading at Guadalcanal and began its return journey unseen by Scott's warships, using a route that passed south of the
Russell Islands and
New Georgia. Despite extensive damage,
Aoba was able to join
Kinugasa in retirement to the north through the Slot.
Furutaka's damage caused her to lose power around 00:50, and she sank at 02:28,
22 miles (35 km) northwest of Savo Island.
Hatsuyuki picked up
Furutaka's survivors and joined the retreat northward.
Boise extinguished her fires by 02:40 and at 03:05 rejoined Scott's formation.
Duncan, on fire, was abandoned by her crew at 02:00. Unaware of
Duncan's fate, Scott detached
McCalla to search for her and retired with the rest of his ships towards Noumea, arriving in the afternoon of
October 13.
McCalla located the burning, abandoned
Duncan about 03:00, and several members of
McCalla's crew made an attempt to keep her from sinking. By 12:00, however, they'd to abandon the effort as interior bulkheads within
Duncan collapsed causing the ship to finally sink
6 miles (10 km) north of Savo Island. American servicemen in boats from Guadalcanal as well as
McCalla picked up
Duncan's scattered survivors from the sea around Savo. In total, 195
Duncan sailors survived; 48 did not. As they rescued
Duncan's crew, the Americans came across the more than 100
Fubuki survivors, floating in the same general area. The Japanese initially refused all rescue attempts but a day later allowed themselves to be picked up and taken prisoner.
Jojima, learning of the bombardment force's crisis, detached destroyers
Shirayuki and
Murakumo to assist
Furutaka or her survivors and
Asagumo and
Natsugumo to rendezvous with
Kinugasa, which had paused in her retreat northward to cover the withdrawal of Jojima's ships. At 07:00, five CAF
SBD Dauntless dive bombers attacked
Kinugasa but inflicted no damage. At 08:20, 11 more SBDs found and attacked
Shirayuki and
Murakumo. Although they scored no direct hits, a near miss caused
Murakumo to begin leaking oil, marking a trail for other CAF aircraft to follow. A short time later, seven more CAF SBDs plus six
TBF Avengers accompanied by 14 Wildcats found the two Japanese destroyers
170 miles (274 km) from Guadalcanal. In the ensuing attack,
Murakumo was hit by a torpedo in her engineering spaces, leaving her without power. In the meantime,
Aoba and
Hatsuyuki reached the sanctuary of the Japanese base in the Shortland Islands at 10:00.
Rushing to assist
Murakumo,
Asagumo and
Natsugumo were attacked by another group of 11 CAF SBDs and TBFs escorted by 12 fighters at 15:45. An SBD placed its bomb almost directly amidships on
Natsugumo while two more near misses contributed to her severe damage. After
Asagumo took off her survivors,
Natsugumo sank at 16:27. The CAF aircraft also scored several more hits on the stationary
Murakumo, setting her afire. After her crew abandoned ship,
Shirayuki scuttled her with a torpedo, picked up her survivors, and joined the rest of the Japanese warships for the remainder of their return trip to the Shortland Islands.
Aftermath and significance
Captain Kikunori Kijima, Gotō's chief of staff and commander of the bombardment force during the return trip to the Shortland Islands after Gotō's death in battle, claimed that his force had sunk two American cruisers and one destroyer.
Furutaka's captain, who survived the sinking of his ship, blamed the loss of his cruiser on bad air reconnaissance and poor leadership from the 8th fleet staff under Admiral Mikawa. Although Gotō's bombardment mission failed, Jojima's reinforcement convoy was successful in delivering the crucial men and equipment to Guadalcanal.
Aoba journeyed to
Kure,
Japan, for repairs that were completed on
February 15,
1943.
Kinugasa was sunk one month later during the
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.
Scott claimed that his force sank three Japanese cruisers and four destroyers. News of the victory was widely publicized in the American media.
Boise, which was damaged enough to require a trip to the
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for repairs, was dubbed the "one-ship fleet" by the press for her exploits in the battle, although this was mainly because the names of the other involved ships were withheld for security reasons.
Boise was under repair until
March 20,
1943.
Although a tactical victory for the U.S., Cape Esperance had little immediate, strategic effect on the situation on Guadalcanal. Just two days later on the night of
October 13, the Japanese battleships
Kongō and
Haruna bombarded and almost destroyed Henderson Field. One day after that, a large Japanese convoy successfully delivered 4,500 troops and equipment to the island. These troops and equipment helped complete Japanese preparations for the large land offensive, scheduled to begin on
October 23. The convoy of U.S. Army troops reached Guadalcanal on
October 13 as planned and were key participants for the Allied side in the decisive land
battle for Henderson Field that took place
October 23 –
October 26,
1942.
The Cape Esperance victory helped prevent an accurate U.S. assessment of Japanese skills and tactics in naval night fighting. The U.S. was still unaware of the range and power of Japanese torpedoes, the effectiveness of Japanese night optics, and the skilled fighting ability of most Japanese destroyer and cruiser commanders. Incorrectly applying the perceived lessons learned from this battle, U.S. commanders in future naval night battles in the Solomons consistently tried to prove that American naval gunfire was more effective than Japanese torpedo attacks. This belief was severely tested just two months later during the
Battle of Tassafaronga, in which Japanese torpedoes inflicted one of the worst defeats suffered by the U.S. Navy in its history. In retrospect, it appears that luck may have had as much to do with Scott's victory at Cape Esperance as the complacency that allowed Gotō's ships to be surprised by Scott's force. A junior officer on
Helena later wrote, "Cape Esperance was a three-sided battle in which chance was the major winner."
Further Information
Get more info on 'Battle Of Cape Esperance'.
|
External Link Exchanges
Do you know how hard it is to get a link from a large encyclopaedia? Well we're different and will prove it. To get a link from us just add the following HTML to your site on a relevant page:
<a href="http://battle_of_cape_esperance.totallyexplained.com">Battle of Cape Esperance Totally Explained</a>
Then simply click through this link from your web page. Our crawlers will verify your link, extract the title of your web page and instantly add a link back to it. If you like you can remove the words Totally Explained and embed the link in article text.
As long as your link remains in place, we'll keep our link to you right here. Please play fair - our crawlers are watching. Your site must be closely related to this one's topic. Any kind of spamming, dubious practises or removing the link will result in your link from us being dropped and, potentially, your whole site being banned. |
